Are Moral Values Overriding?: How Beauty Challenges Robert Adams’s Theory of Value
This article addresses the following meta-ethical question: do moral values have a special position among other values? According to Robert Adams, moral values do have a special position and are of overriding importance. I argue that the 'overridingness' thesis is inconsistent with Adams’s...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2021
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| Dans: |
Journal of religious ethics
Année: 2021, Volume: 49, Numéro: 4, Pages: 681-693 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Robert Adams
B Value Theory B Divine Command Theory B Meta-ethics B Aesthetics B Christian Ethics |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | This article addresses the following meta-ethical question: do moral values have a special position among other values? According to Robert Adams, moral values do have a special position and are of overriding importance. I argue that the 'overridingness' thesis is inconsistent with Adams’s value theory that only God has value in himself and all other things are valuable to the extent that they resemble God. I consider some possible ways of integrating the overridingness thesis that are latent in Adams’s work and argue that none succeeds. My main contribution is to propose a solution to the inconsistency in Adams’s theory. I argue that a theological account of beauty gives us reason to reject the overridingness thesis. Morality overrides some other concerns, but not all other concerns. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12374 |