Are Moral Values Overriding?: How Beauty Challenges Robert Adams’s Theory of Value

This article addresses the following meta-ethical question: do moral values have a special position among other values? According to Robert Adams, moral values do have a special position and are of overriding importance. I argue that the 'overridingness' thesis is inconsistent with Adams’s...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of religious ethics
Main Author: Jakobsen, Martin 1989- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 2021
In: Journal of religious ethics
Year: 2021, Volume: 49, Issue: 4, Pages: 681-693
Further subjects:B Robert Adams
B Value Theory
B Divine Command Theory
B Meta-ethics
B Aesthetics
B Christian Ethics
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:This article addresses the following meta-ethical question: do moral values have a special position among other values? According to Robert Adams, moral values do have a special position and are of overriding importance. I argue that the 'overridingness' thesis is inconsistent with Adams’s value theory that only God has value in himself and all other things are valuable to the extent that they resemble God. I consider some possible ways of integrating the overridingness thesis that are latent in Adams’s work and argue that none succeeds. My main contribution is to propose a solution to the inconsistency in Adams’s theory. I argue that a theological account of beauty gives us reason to reject the overridingness thesis. Morality overrides some other concerns, but not all other concerns.
ISSN:1467-9795
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/jore.12374