God's Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem
One prominent response, based on the work of Robert Adams, Edward Wierenga, and others, to the Euthyphro objection to the divine command theory is to point out that God is essentially omnibenevolent. The commands of an essentially loving being will not be arbitrary since they are grounded in his nat...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Netherlands
[2019]
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Dans: |
Sophia
Année: 2019, Volume: 58, Numéro: 3, Pages: 437-453 |
RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu NCA Éthique |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Divine Command Theory
B Euthyphro dilemma B Theistic ethics |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Résumé: | One prominent response, based on the work of Robert Adams, Edward Wierenga, and others, to the Euthyphro objection to the divine command theory is to point out that God is essentially omnibenevolent. The commands of an essentially loving being will not be arbitrary since they are grounded in his nature, nor is it possible for a loving God to issue horrendous commands such as the gratuitous torture of infants. This paper argues that this response is inadequate. The divine command theory attributes to God the power to make an action morally obligatory. Given the reasonable assumption that any omnipotent being has the same powers as God, contemplating the commands of a malevolent deity is enough to cast doubt on the claim that any being, loving or otherwise, has the power to make an action morally obligatory just by commanding it. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0615-8 |