Covenants and Commands

Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory argues that moral obligations are idealized versions of everyday social requirements. One type of social requirement is the ordinary demand one person makes of one another. Its idealized version is the perfect command a perfect God makes of those he lo...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of religious ethics
Main Author: Alimi, Toni (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Wiley-Blackwell [2020]
In: Journal of religious ethics
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Adams, Robert Merrihew 1937- / Virtue ethics / Duty / Promise
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
CH Christianity and Society
NCC Social ethics
Further subjects:B Robert Adams
B Divine Command
B Promises
B Ethical Theory
B Covenants
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory argues that moral obligations are idealized versions of everyday social requirements. One type of social requirement is the ordinary demand one person makes of one another. Its idealized version is the perfect command a perfect God makes of those he loves. This paper extends Adams’s account of moral obligation by considering another kind of social requirement: promises. It argues that we can understand a divine covenant as an idealized version of a promise. Promisers take on social requirements to promisees when they make promises. Analogously, God takes on obligations to humans when God makes covenants with them. Divine command theorists might fear that this makes God subject to moral rules not of his own choosing. This paper considers these fears and argues that they are unwarranted.
ISSN:1467-9795
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/jore.12319