Propositions: Who Needs Them?: Craig’s Nominalism Revisited

William Lane Craig maintains that propositions and properties are not real. Yet, if we examine his proposed nominalism and his appeal to Rudolf Carnap’s linguistic frameworks, we can find that his view depends upon their reality, even as abstract objects. By drawing upon phenomenological insights, I...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Smith, R. Scott 1957- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Evangelical Philosophical Society 2022
In: Philosophia Christi
Year: 2022, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, Pages: 241-255
RelBib Classification:KAJ Church history 1914-; recent history
VA Philosophy
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Summary:William Lane Craig maintains that propositions and properties are not real. Yet, if we examine his proposed nominalism and his appeal to Rudolf Carnap’s linguistic frameworks, we can find that his view depends upon their reality, even as abstract objects. By drawing upon phenomenological insights, I argue that if we pay close attention to what can be before our minds in conscious awareness, we can become aware that there is more to what is real than simple, concrete particulars, even in his linguistic examples. We can become aware of the reality of Platonic, ante rem universals, including propositions and properties.
ISSN:2640-2580
Contains:Enthalten in: Philosophia Christi
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/pc202224221