Craigs Nominalism and the High Cost of Preserving Divine Aseity
William Lane Craig rejects Platonism (the view that uncreated abstract objects (AOs) exist) in favor of nominalism because he believes Platonism fatally compromises Gods aseity. For Craig, concrete particulars (including essences) exist, but properties do not. Yet, we use property-talk, following C...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2017]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2017, Volume: 9, Issue: 1, Pages: 87-107 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Craig, William Lane 1949-
/ Nominalism
/ God
/ Aseity of God
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | William Lane Craig rejects Platonism (the view that uncreated abstract objects (AOs) exist) in favor of nominalism because he believes Platonism fatally compromises Gods aseity. For Craig, concrete particulars (including essences) exist, but properties do not. Yet, we use property-talk, following Carnaps linguistic frameworks. There is, however, a high cost to Craigs view. I survey his views and then explore the importance of essences. But, next, I show that his nominalism undermines them. Thus, we have just interpretations of reality. Worse, nominalism undermines creations determinacy. Last, I suggest AOs are created, but in a more fundamental sense than Craig considers. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1866 |