The troublesome explanandum in Plantinga’s argument against naturalism

Intending to have a constructive dialogue with the combination of evolutionary theory (E) and metaphysical naturalism (N), Alvin Plantinga’s “evolutionary argument against naturalism” (EAAN) takes the reliability of human cognition (in normal environments) as a purported explanandum and E&N as a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Xu, Yingjin (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2011
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2011, Volume: 69, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-15
Further subjects:B Testimony
B Probability
B Cognition
B Naturalism
B Reliability
B evolutionary theory
B Plantinga
B Explanandum
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Summary:Intending to have a constructive dialogue with the combination of evolutionary theory (E) and metaphysical naturalism (N), Alvin Plantinga’s “evolutionary argument against naturalism” (EAAN) takes the reliability of human cognition (in normal environments) as a purported explanandum and E&N as a purported explanans. Then, he considers whether E&N can offer a good explanans for this explanandum, and his answer is negative (an answer employed by him to produce a defeater for N). But I will argue that the whole EAAN goes wrong by assuming that R is a qualified explanandum crying out for scientific explanations, since it cannot meet either of the two criteria for any scientifically qualified explanandum: Realizability Criterion and Informativeness Criterion. Hence, EAAN is simply setting a task that E&N, as a scientific theory, will not care at all. Therefore, EAAN cannot substantially shake E&N.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9228-7