Eudaimonism and the Ground of Normative Reasons
This essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian-Scotist objection to what he calls a single-source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of norm...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2022
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Dans: |
Journal of religious ethics
Année: 2022, Volume: 50, Numéro: 1, Pages: 84-102 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
John Duns Scotus
B Eudaimonism B Enjoyment B Normative reasons B Egoism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | This essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian-Scotist objection to what he calls a single-source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of normative reasons in eudaimonism while also taking a page from Scotus's ethics. I argue that the main issue with eudaimonism is with the ultimate end and manner of our willing, which fails to correspond to the right ordering of love based on the nature of goodness in the object. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12382 |