On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons
According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-calle...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
---|---|
Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
|
In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2016, Band: 19, Heft: 5, Seiten: 1211-1223 |
RelBib Classification: | NCA Ethik VA Philosophie |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Schroeder
B Action B Practical deliberation B Williams B Normative reason B Reasons internalism |
Online Zugang: |
Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Zusammenfassung: | According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called internalist theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams claim: Schroeders (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams claim is compatible with this expansive account of what it is to act for a normative reason. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8 |