Scepticism and Self-Detachment
Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic...
Auteur principal: | |
---|---|
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2020
|
Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2020, Volume: 10, Numéro: 3/4, Pages: 235-255 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Sextus, Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae institutiones
/ Scepticisme
/ Soi
/ Distance
|
RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Tranquility
B self-detachment B psychological unity B suspension of judgment B apraxia argument B Scepticism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (Verlag) |
Résumé: | Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10011 |