Scepticism and Self-Detachment

Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Perin, Casey (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Brill 2020
Dans: International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2020, Volume: 10, Numéro: 3/4, Pages: 235-255
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Sextus, Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae institutiones / Scepticisme / Soi / Distance
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Tranquility
B self-detachment
B psychological unity
B suspension of judgment
B apraxia argument
B Scepticism
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Résumé:Abstract This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10011