Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism

This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Barel, Frank (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2012
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2012, Volume: 2, Issue: 1, Pages: 21-43
Further subjects:B perceptual anti-individualism perceptual entitlement reliability scepticism Burge Brueckner
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Summary:This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows us to outright deny that we in our philosophical theory need a reason to reject the sceptical scenario. The answer to this question is ‘no’. However, as I go on to show, Burge’s position includes further resources that allow for an anti-sceptical argument.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/221057012X630696