On Love's Robustness
Recently Philip Pettit (2015) has claimed that attachment, virtue, and respect are robust goods. Robust goods require not only the actual provision of certain associated 'thin' goods, but also the modally robust provision of these thin goods across a range of counterfactual situations. I f...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2018, Band: 21, Heft: 4, Seiten: 915-925 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCB Individualethik VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Love
B Disposition B Robustness B Care |
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Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (Verlag) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Recently Philip Pettit (2015) has claimed that attachment, virtue, and respect are robust goods. Robust goods require not only the actual provision of certain associated 'thin' goods, but also the modally robust provision of these thin goods across a range of counterfactual situations. I focus my attention on Pettit's account of the robust good of love, which, for Pettit, is the modally robust provision of care. I argue Pettit's account provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for love. In place of Pettit's account, I suggest an alternative account of love that distinguishes loving dispositions from loving actions. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9929-z |