On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons

According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-calle...

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1. VerfasserIn: Sinclair, Neil (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2016]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2016, Band: 19, Heft: 5, Seiten: 1211-1223
RelBib Classification:NCA Ethik
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Schroeder
B Action
B Practical deliberation
B Williams
B Normative reason
B Reasons internalism
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