On Susan Wolfs Good-for-Nothings
According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, Good-For-Nothings, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, musi...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2015, Volume: 18, Numéro: 5, Pages: 1071-1081 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Value Theory
B Well-being B Pleasure B Aesthetics B Welfarism B Susan Wolf |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, Good-For-Nothings, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which I call The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarists Mistake. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments and explain where, in my view, each goes wrong. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9588-2 |