Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism
Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel have offered a critique of the sensitivity condition on knowledge. According to them, the condition implies that you cannot know of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. Their arguments rest on the claim that you cannot sensiti...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2016
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2016, Band: 6, Heft: 4, Seiten: 351-367 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
知识
/ 敏感度
/ 怀疑主义
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| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
sensitivity
reflective knowledge
skepticism
internalism
externalism
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| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel have offered a critique of the sensitivity condition on knowledge. According to them, the condition implies that you cannot know of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. Their arguments rest on the claim that you cannot sensitively believe of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. However, as we shall see, these philosophers are mistaken. You can do so. That said, these philosophers were close to the mark. There are some related propositions that you cannot believe sensitively. These propositions are interesting in another respect: they can be used to construct a new skeptical argument that is superior in some respects to a more traditional skeptical argument. This new skeptical argument also reveals insights about the relationship between internalism, externalism, and skepticism. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00511173 |