Are There Any True Moral Enhancements?: Aristotelian and Thomistic Perspectives

Questions about moral enhancements have arisen within the context of transhumanism. One of the most fundamental of these questions is whether true moral enhancements are even possible. My paper aims to address this question with a 'yes' and 'no' reply. After laying out criteria f...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Rath, Beth A. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Allemand
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Publié: Mohr Siebeck 2023
Dans: Philosophy, theology and the sciences
Année: 2023, Volume: 10, Numéro: 2, Pages: 221-237
RelBib Classification:KAE Moyen Âge central
NBE Anthropologie
NCA Éthique
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Transhumanism
B Moral enhancements
B Virtue
B Thomas Aquinas
B Aristotle
Accès en ligne: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Résumé:Questions about moral enhancements have arisen within the context of transhumanism. One of the most fundamental of these questions is whether true moral enhancements are even possible. My paper aims to address this question with a 'yes' and 'no' reply. After laying out criteria for what counts as moral enhancements, I look at whether it is possible to make a person morally better within the context of two distinct virtue-ethics frameworks, namely, Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas's. I argue that, on Aristotle's account, no biotechnological moral enhancement can directly make someone morally virtuous, although virtue may be enhanced indirectly. For Aquinas, the same argument holds, but I show that, on his view, grace counts as the only true moral enhancement.
ISSN:2197-2834
Contient:Enthalten in: Philosophy, theology and the sciences
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1628/ptsc-2023-0022