Are There Any True Moral Enhancements?: Aristotelian and Thomistic Perspectives
Questions about moral enhancements have arisen within the context of transhumanism. One of the most fundamental of these questions is whether true moral enhancements are even possible. My paper aims to address this question with a 'yes' and 'no' reply. After laying out criteria f...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Allemand |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Mohr Siebeck
2023
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Dans: |
Philosophy, theology and the sciences
Année: 2023, Volume: 10, Numéro: 2, Pages: 221-237 |
RelBib Classification: | KAE Moyen Âge central NBE Anthropologie NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Transhumanism
B Moral enhancements B Virtue B Thomas Aquinas B Aristotle |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Résumé: | Questions about moral enhancements have arisen within the context of transhumanism. One of the most fundamental of these questions is whether true moral enhancements are even possible. My paper aims to address this question with a 'yes' and 'no' reply. After laying out criteria for what counts as moral enhancements, I look at whether it is possible to make a person morally better within the context of two distinct virtue-ethics frameworks, namely, Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas's. I argue that, on Aristotle's account, no biotechnological moral enhancement can directly make someone morally virtuous, although virtue may be enhanced indirectly. For Aquinas, the same argument holds, but I show that, on his view, grace counts as the only true moral enhancement. |
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ISSN: | 2197-2834 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Philosophy, theology and the sciences
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1628/ptsc-2023-0022 |