Pittard on Religious Disagreement

This paper focuses on Pittard’s path to rationalism. It begins from the master argument Pittard identifies against rational disagreement among epistemic peers. It raises an issue for Pittard’s endorsement of the first premise of that argument, but focuses primarily on the third premise. It suggests...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1954- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2023
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2023, Volume: 13, Issue: 4, Pages: 311-324
Further subjects:B Rationalism
B permissivism
B Reflection
B partisan justification
B Reliability
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Summary:This paper focuses on Pittard’s path to rationalism. It begins from the master argument Pittard identifies against rational disagreement among epistemic peers. It raises an issue for Pittard’s endorsement of the first premise of that argument, but focuses primarily on the third premise. It suggests a way of denying the third premise beyond the possibilities Pittard identifies, and then questions the strategy Pittard uses for ruling out competitors to his rationalism for defending the possibility of partisan justification in cases of peer disagreement.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10044