Only Half the Truth. Proclus on Aristotle’s Deficient Metaphysics
In this paper I argue that Proclus’ criticism of the causality of Aristotle’s intellect is part of a general attack on Aristotle’s metaphysics. I show how Proclus criticises Aristotle for rejecting the One as a metaphysical principle and the metaphysical confusion that arises from this. Additionally...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2023
|
| Dans: |
Phronesis
Année: 2023, Volume: 68, Numéro: 4, Pages: 438-466 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Proclus
B prime mover B Metaphysics B Neoplatonism B Aristotle |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | In this paper I argue that Proclus’ criticism of the causality of Aristotle’s intellect is part of a general attack on Aristotle’s metaphysics. I show how Proclus criticises Aristotle for rejecting the One as a metaphysical principle and the metaphysical confusion that arises from this. Additionally, I claim that for Proclus Aristotle’s understanding of efficient causality differs from Plato’s and I discuss two of his arguments that Aristotle should have accepted the intellect as an efficient cause. As I show throughout, Proclus differs in his approach to Aristotle from the harmonising agenda of Ammonius and Simplicius. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Phronesis
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10077 |