The Modal Argument and a Rejoinder to Contingent Physicalism
Since the time of Descartes, various versions of a modal argument have been proffered for substance dualism. Until recently, the premise most frequently attacked is one that moves from conceivability to metaphysical possibility. However, more recently, a new criticism has surfaced, viz., an argument...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
2023
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| In: |
TheoLogica
Year: 2023, Volume: 7, Issue: 2, Pages: 1-19 |
| RelBib Classification: | TK Recent history VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Since the time of Descartes, various versions of a modal argument have been proffered for substance dualism. Until recently, the premise most frequently attacked is one that moves from conceivability to metaphysical possibility. However, more recently, a new criticism has surfaced, viz., an argument from contingent physicalism. The purpose of this article is to show that what I take to be the most sophisticated contingent physicalist criticism fails as a defeater of the modal argument. After stating and clarifying my version of the modal argument, I present arguments from contingent physicalist Trenton Merricks that are intended explicitly to be defeaters of premise (2) of the modal argument. Along the way, I give reasons for thinking that these arguments fail as defeaters of (2) and that Merricks’ contingent physicalism is false. |
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| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v7i2.67923 |