Emotion and Religion Revisited: A Response to O'Connor and Averill

O'Connor is critical of Watts' suggestion that emotion can serve as a model for religion. The proposal arises from recent developments in the psychology of emotion that emphasize that it is socially embedded and dependent on processes of interpretation. Similar points have been made about...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Watts, Fraser N. 1946- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 1996
Dans: The international journal for the psychology of religion
Année: 1996, Volume: 6, Numéro: 3, Pages: 175-179
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Édition parallèle:Électronique
Description
Résumé:O'Connor is critical of Watts' suggestion that emotion can serve as a model for religion. The proposal arises from recent developments in the psychology of emotion that emphasize that it is socially embedded and dependent on processes of interpretation. Similar points have been made about religion: Neither religion nor emotion are purely private matters. More generally, it is urged that there be stronger links between general psychology and the psychology of religion, and also that the psychology of religion be broadened to include a two-way dialogue between theology and psychology. Averill's point is accepted that emotional experience is too much shaped by religion to be allowed to validate it. As a contribution to Averill's question about emotions in the afterlife, points are made about the bodily aspect of the afterlife, the emotions of God, and redeemed emotions.
ISSN:1532-7582
Contient:Enthalten in: The international journal for the psychology of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1207/s15327582ijpr0603_5