The Epistemic Criterion: A Response to Michael Hand
This article is a response to Michael Hand’s critique in this issue of my response to his use of the epistemic criterion as the sole means for identifying whether or not an issue should be identified as controversial. I argue that he has misunderstood my intention in suggesting that I was seeking to...
| Published in: | Journal of beliefs and values |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge
2014
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| In: |
Journal of beliefs and values
Year: 2014, Volume: 35, Issue: 1, Pages: 86-89 |
| Further subjects: | B
epistemic criterion
B diversity criterion B decisiveness of reason B Fair play B Controversial Issues B Michael Hand |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | This article is a response to Michael Hand’s critique in this issue of my response to his use of the epistemic criterion as the sole means for identifying whether or not an issue should be identified as controversial. I argue that he has misunderstood my intention in suggesting that I was seeking to replace the epistemic criterion. Rather my purpose was to challenge his over-confidence in the decisiveness of reason and to temper his use of the epistemic criterion by suggesting it needed to embrace ethical concerns. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-9362 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of beliefs and values
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/13617672.2014.884858 |