Moral horror

The common belief is that it is appropriate to feel moral horror when faced with cases of extreme evil (such as the Nazi holocaust). It is argued here that this is a mistake, and that certain kinds of emotional reactions (including horror, shock and outrage) only reinforce our own self-images, and d...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs: Wilson, John (Auteur) ; Wilson, Nicholas (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Routledge 2003
Dans: Journal of beliefs and values
Année: 2003, Volume: 24, Numéro: 3, Pages: 321-327
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:The common belief is that it is appropriate to feel moral horror when faced with cases of extreme evil (such as the Nazi holocaust). It is argued here that this is a mistake, and that certain kinds of emotional reactions (including horror, shock and outrage) only reinforce our own self-images, and do nothing to understand or cure moral evil. A better policy is to consider such cases impartially (though also seriously), as we would with non-moral mistakes: otherwise these reactions are self-indulgent.
ISSN:1469-9362
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of beliefs and values
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/1361767032000156093