Moral horror
The common belief is that it is appropriate to feel moral horror when faced with cases of extreme evil (such as the Nazi holocaust). It is argued here that this is a mistake, and that certain kinds of emotional reactions (including horror, shock and outrage) only reinforce our own self-images, and d...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge
2003
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| In: |
Journal of beliefs and values
Year: 2003, Volume: 24, Issue: 3, Pages: 321-327 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The common belief is that it is appropriate to feel moral horror when faced with cases of extreme evil (such as the Nazi holocaust). It is argued here that this is a mistake, and that certain kinds of emotional reactions (including horror, shock and outrage) only reinforce our own self-images, and do nothing to understand or cure moral evil. A better policy is to consider such cases impartially (though also seriously), as we would with non-moral mistakes: otherwise these reactions are self-indulgent. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-9362 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of beliefs and values
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/1361767032000156093 |