Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism

This essay examines Nancey Murphy's commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher-level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1) nonreductive physicalism lacks adequate resources upo...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Bielfeldt, Dennis D. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Wiley-Blackwell 1999
Dans: Zygon
Année: 1999, Volume: 34, Numéro: 4, Pages: 619-628
Sujets non-standardisés:B nonreductive phsicalism
B downward causation
B supervenience
B Reductionism
B kenotic devine action
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Édition parallèle:Non-électronique
Description
Résumé:This essay examines Nancey Murphy's commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher-level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1) nonreductive physicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience's nonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher-level properties by those at the lower level; and (3) the notion of divine self-renunciation, while consonant with Murphy's claim of supervenient, divine action, is nonetheless problematic. Throughout, I claim that the question of the causal efficacy of a level is logically independent from the assertion of its conceptual or nomological nonreducibility.
ISSN:1467-9744
Contient:Enthalten in: Zygon
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/0591-2385.00240