The Breakdown of the Constitutional Tradition: Macintyrian and Theological Responses
In The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism H. Jefferson Powell relies on the work of philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre to argue that American constitutional discourse is an intellectual tradition which has reached an unresolvable epistemological crisis. Accepting this crisis, Powell narrates...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2000
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| Dans: |
Journal of law and religion
Année: 2000, Volume: 14, Numéro: 2, Pages: 351-389 |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | In The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism H. Jefferson Powell relies on the work of philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre to argue that American constitutional discourse is an intellectual tradition which has reached an unresolvable epistemological crisis. Accepting this crisis, Powell narrates a Christian theological response to that crisis. This article continues to struggle with the questions that Powell's work has raised, seeking to add to Powell's arguments regarding a significant breakdown in constitutional adjudication, to consider what might be labeled as "MacIntyrian responses" to that crisis, and, finally, to present a further Christian theological response to the crisis.In the first section, I will make the argument that there has been a significant breakdown in the constitutional tradition. This claim is supported by a summary of Powell's argument regarding an epistemological crisis in constitutional law, consideration of the Court's recent trend towards acting with a politicized understanding of adjudication, and analysis of the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence. Section II presents three proposed tradition-dependent responses to constitutional interpretation: the first, a self-styled Aristotelian mode of adjudication; the second, Yale constitutional scholar Jed Rubenfeld's "commitmentarian theory" of adjudication; and finally Phillip Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian rejection of justificatory theories themselves. In considering these responses critically, I will maintain that each fails insofar as they remain at the level of theoretical abstraction without suggesting what substantive community, other than the tradition-rejecting tradition of liberalism, could inform a tradition-dependent mode of adjudication. |
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| ISSN: | 2163-3088 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of law and religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/3556575 |