An Examination of a Moral Argument against Nuclear Deterrence

After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: McKim, Robert (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 1985
In: Journal of religious ethics
Year: 1985, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 279-297
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic
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Summary:After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong to do. My conclusion is that there is something to this argument, that it is sufficient to establish a "prima facie" case against nuclear deterrence, but that it is not sufficient to establish a conclusive case against nuclear deterrence.
ISSN:1467-9795
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics