Moral Monads and Ethical Reductionism
Daniel C. Maguire (1978, 1982) has presented a moral theory based on affective experiences. He sees this sort of theory as protection against ethical relativism as well as leading toward a morality necessarily based on religion. Along the way, ethical reductionism is discarded. This paper argues tha...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1984
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| In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 1984, Volume: 12, Issue: 1, Pages: 116-122 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | Daniel C. Maguire (1978, 1982) has presented a moral theory based on affective experiences. He sees this sort of theory as protection against ethical relativism as well as leading toward a morality necessarily based on religion. Along the way, ethical reductionism is discarded. This paper argues that precisely the opposite has happened. Maguire is open to the charge of ethical relativism and so loses religion as a base. A sense can be given to ethical reductionism and to what Maguire terms "the intellectual fallacy" such that the reductionism is no enemy and the fallacy, no fallacy. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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