Some critical reflections on the hiddenness argument

J.L. Schellenberg’s Argument from Divine Hiddenness maintains that if a perfectly loving God exists, then there is no non-resistant non-belief. Given that such nonbelief exists, however, it follows that there is no perfectly loving God. To support the conditional claim, Schellenberg presents concept...

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Auteurs: Aijaz, Imran (Auteur) ; Weidler, Markus (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2007
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2007, Volume: 61, Numéro: 1, Pages: 1-23
Sujets non-standardisés:B Belief
B Divine Hiddenness
B Vanstone
B Nonbelief
B Loving God
B Schellenberg
B Accommodationist strategy
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Édition parallèle:Électronique
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Résumé:J.L. Schellenberg’s Argument from Divine Hiddenness maintains that if a perfectly loving God exists, then there is no non-resistant non-belief. Given that such nonbelief exists, however, it follows that there is no perfectly loving God. To support the conditional claim, Schellenberg presents conceptual and analogical considerations, which we subject to critical scrutiny. We also evaluate Schellenberg’s claim that the belief that God exists is logically necessary for entering into a relationship with the Divine. Finally, we turn to possible variants of Schellenberg’s case, and argue that the modifications necessary to accommodate our criticismas leave those variants with much less of a sting than originally suggested by his provocative formulation.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-006-9103-8