Divine hiddenness and the problem of no greater goods

John Schellenberg argues that God would never withhold the possibility of conscious personal relationship with Him from anyone for the sake of greater goods, since there simply would not be greater goods than a conscious personal relationship with God. Given that nonresistant nonbelief withholds the...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Teeninga, Luke (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2021
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2021, Volume: 89, Numéro: 2, Pages: 107-123
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Théodicée / Summum bonum
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
NBC Dieu
Sujets non-standardisés:B Theism
B Divine Hiddenness
B Atheism
B Problem of no greater goods
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:John Schellenberg argues that God would never withhold the possibility of conscious personal relationship with Him from anyone for the sake of greater goods, since there simply would not be greater goods than a conscious personal relationship with God. Given that nonresistant nonbelief withholds the possibility of such relationship, this entails that God would not allow nonresistant nonbelief for the sake of greater goods. Thus, if Schellenberg is right, all greater goods responses to the hiddenness argument must fail in principle. I argue that there are good reasons for thinking that greater goods responses do not, for the above reason, fail in principle.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09767-7