Skeptical theism and value judgments

One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Anderson, David James (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2012
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 72, Issue: 1, Pages: 27-39
Further subjects:B All things considered value
B problem of evil
B Skeptical theism
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Parallel Edition:Electronic

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