Skeptical Theism Remains Refuted: a Reply to Perrine

In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypo...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Johnson, David Kyle (Auteur)
Collaborateurs: Perrine, Timothy (Antécédent bibliographique)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: Springer Netherlands [2017]
Dans: Sophia
Année: 2017, Volume: 56, Numéro: 2, Pages: 367-371
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
NBC Dieu
VB Herméneutique; philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Atheism
B Bayes Theorem
B Skeptical theism
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Résumé:In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypotheses equally. In 2015, Timothy Perrine argued that, since Bayes Theorem doesn’t always equally distribute the probability of falsified hypotheses, my argument is undermined unless I can also show that my thesis follows on a Bayesian analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to meet that burden.
ISSN:1873-930X
Référence:Kritik von "A Note on Johnson’s ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism’ (2015)"
Contient:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0599-4