Skeptical Theism Remains Refuted: a Reply to Perrine
In my 2013 article A Refutation of Skeptical Theism, I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of Gods existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypo...
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Collaborateurs: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Netherlands
[2017]
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Dans: |
Sophia
Année: 2017, Volume: 56, Numéro: 2, Pages: 367-371 |
RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu VB Herméneutique; philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Atheism
B Bayes Theorem B Skeptical theism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Résumé: | In my 2013 article A Refutation of Skeptical Theism, I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of Gods existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypotheses equally. In 2015, Timothy Perrine argued that, since Bayes Theorem doesnt always equally distribute the probability of falsified hypotheses, my argument is undermined unless I can also show that my thesis follows on a Bayesian analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to meet that burden. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Référence: | Kritik von "A Note on Johnsons A Refutation of Skeptical Theism (2015)"
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Contient: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0599-4 |