An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument
This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea, judgment, or belief). This lack of epistemic responsibility i...
| Auteurs: | ; |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
MDPI
2022
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| Dans: |
Religions
Année: 2022, Volume: 13, Numéro: 10 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Deliberation
B Determinism B epistemic responsibility B Libertarian freedom |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea, judgment, or belief). This lack of epistemic responsibility is problematic for the naturalist. It seems to be an even worse problem, however, for the exhaustive divine determinist because not only would humanity not stand in a position to be blamed for any of our thoughts and beliefs, but it also surfaces a “problem of epistemic evil”, which can be raised against the knowledge of God, the rationality of humans, and the trustworthiness of Scripture. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel13100988 |