Summa et Perfecta Gloria: Cicero on Ambition, Reputation, and Care for Future Human Beings
Among Roman philosophers, none considers what glory is, what uses it has, and how it fits in to his own life (and the lives of others desiring to be good) more carefully than Cicero. Cicero’s De gloria (On Glory), a philosophical treatise on glory, is mentioned by Cicero and ancient sources, and was...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Peeters
2022
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2022, Volume: 29, Issue: 1, Pages: 7-31 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Cicero, Marcus Tullius 106 BC-43 BC
/ Glory
/ Virtue
/ Legacy
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| RelBib Classification: | BE Greco-Roman religions NCA Ethics TB Antiquity VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Among Roman philosophers, none considers what glory is, what uses it has, and how it fits in to his own life (and the lives of others desiring to be good) more carefully than Cicero. Cicero’s De gloria (On Glory), a philosophical treatise on glory, is mentioned by Cicero and ancient sources, and was supposed to have been seen by Petrarch, but has been lost. Nevertheless, in Cicero’s extant works we can trace an account of Cicero’s concept of vera/summa/perfecta gloria (true/highest/perfect glory) and its role in the moral life of both the ethical aspirant and exemplary moral agent. In this article, drawing on robust resources from both traditions, I construct a Ciceronian-style argument for the ethical value of this summa gloria (a true glory) as a choice-worthy end of moral aspirants (explicitly not claiming to reconstruct Cicero’s own argument in the lost De gloria), and show that Cicero anticipates and accentuates current philosophical debate regarding admissible moral ambition and care for one’s reputation. In particular, Cicero provides an ethical justification for what Geoffrey Scarre calls ‘care for one’s posthumous reputation’ (though, for Cicero, care for one’s reputation generally is important) and adds motivational complexity to the moral psychology of the exemplar and aspirant (in many ways in concert with Linda Zagzebski’s formulation of Exemplarist Moral Theory, but in others, importantly different). Cicero provides an account of the motivations for why we seek out a good reputation in imitation of moral exemplars beyond mere aspirational attraction. He thinks that most of us have (and ought to have) a deeply rooted concern for our ‘ethical legacy’, far removed from the selfish desire for mere or vulgar fame (fama popularis), but out of care and regard for future human beings (rooted in augurium futurorum at Tusc. Disp. 1.33 and human beings’ inborn social nature). |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.29.1.3290734 |