Précis of Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method

Austin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skept...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Kaplan, Mark 1951- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Brill 2022
Dans: International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2022, Volume: 12, Numéro: 3, Pages: 193-194
Sujets non-standardisés:B Ordinary Language
B Austin’s fidelity requirement
B Skepticism
B J. L. Austin
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Résumé:Austin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skepticism explains why the consensus is mistaken. The book shows that, far from reflecting a failure on Austin’s part to understand the epistemologist’s project, Austin’s fidelity requirement was born of a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived. The book also provides evidence of just how fruitful an epistemology is to be had, once we take that critique to heart and do epistemology as Austin thought it should be done.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10039