From Murphy's Christian Physicalism to Lowe's Dualism
Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overe...
| Auteurs: | ; |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
2021
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| Dans: |
TheoLogica
Année: 2021, Volume: 5, Numéro: 2, Pages: 100-128 |
| RelBib Classification: | CF Christianisme et science KAJ Époque contemporaine NBE Anthropologie VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
E. J. Lowe
B Christian Physicalism B Non-Cartesian substance dualism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience and underestimates dualism. She doesn't show how neuroscience can explain the mind's characteristic qualia, unity, privacy, or causality. We argue that Lowe’s dualism can better explain minds, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Murphy's physicalism thus serves to highlight the value of Lowe's dualism today. |
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| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v5i2.56273 |