The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS):...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Coley, Scott M. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: MDPI 2021
Dans: Religions
Année: 2021, Volume: 12, Numéro: 5
Sujets non-standardisés:B Ethics
B Philosophy of religion
B axiological skepticism
B problem of evil
B Skeptical theism
B modal skepticism
B moral skepticism
B moral epistemology
Accès en ligne: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Résumé:This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether.
ISSN:2077-1444
Référence:Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
Contient:Enthalten in: Religions
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.3390/rel12050313