Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?

Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophe...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Frances, Bryan (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Brill 2020
Dans: International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2020, Volume: 10, Numéro: 3/4, Pages: 325-345
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Philosophe / Foi philosophique / Expert / Rejet / Irrationalité
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B epistemology of philosophy
B Disagreement
B Skepticism
B Controversy
B Metaphilosophy
B Expertise
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Résumé:Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial claims are irrational. This means that most philosophers have irrational philosophical beliefs.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10015