Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?
Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophe...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2020
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Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2020, Volume: 10, Numéro: 3/4, Pages: 325-345 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Philosophe
/ Foi philosophique
/ Expert
/ Rejet
/ Irrationalité
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
epistemology of philosophy
B Disagreement B Skepticism B Controversy B Metaphilosophy B Expertise |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (Verlag) |
Résumé: | Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial claims are irrational. This means that most philosophers have irrational philosophical beliefs. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10015 |