The pre-eminent good argument
According to J. L. Schellenberg, a perfectly loving God wouldn't permit the occurrence of non-resistant non-believers - that is, non-believers who are both capable of believing in and relating to God, but who fail to believe through no fault of their own. Since non-resistant non-believers exist...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2020]
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2020, Volume: 56, Issue: 4, Pages: 596-610 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-, Divine hiddenness and human reason
/ Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-, The wisdom to doubt
/ Deus absconditus
/ Highest good
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | According to J. L. Schellenberg, a perfectly loving God wouldn't permit the occurrence of non-resistant non-believers - that is, non-believers who are both capable of believing in and relating to God, but who fail to believe through no fault of their own. Since non-resistant non-believers exist, says Schellenberg, it follows that God doesn't. A popular response to this argument is some version or other of the greater good defence. God, it's argued, is justified in hiding himself when done for the sake of some greater good. But proponents of this defence have overlooked or neglected an important sub-argument in Schellenberg's case - what I call the "pre-eminent good argument". In this article, I identify the nature of the argument and offer a solution to it. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000914 |