God's propositional omniscience: a defence of the strictly restricted account
By discussing three different understandings of the notion of God's propositional omniscience from a theistic point of view, I show that the strictly restricted account (SPO) - according to which God knows all true propositions that He can know - is preferable to the two other candidates as the...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2020]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2020, Volume: 56, Numéro: 4, Pages: 473-487 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Omniscience
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | By discussing three different understandings of the notion of God's propositional omniscience from a theistic point of view, I show that the strictly restricted account (SPO) - according to which God knows all true propositions that He can know - is preferable to the two other candidates as the standard interpretation of God's propositional omniscience. To establish this conclusion, I argue that Pruss's argument that strictly restricted omniscience (SPO) entails full omniscience (FPO) fails because it relies on a flawed construal of the former thesis. I propose an alternative construal for strictly restricted omniscience and defend it against some potential objections. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000677 |