Does Human Soul Have an Owner?: Patristic Anthropology and Wittgenstein on the Human Identity
In the mainstream anthropology of Byzantine patristics, the human “I” is twice inconsistent, being identical to but different from a “part of God” and, in the created world, being not a something while without being a nothing. The latter kind of inconsistency was described as well by Ludwig Wittgens...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
[2020]
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| Dans: |
Scrinium
Année: 2020, Volume: 16, Numéro: 1, Pages: 30-47 |
| RelBib Classification: | KAB Christianisme primitif NBE Anthropologie TK Époque contemporaine VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Free Will
B patristic anthropology B Gregory of Nazianzus B Subject B Wittgenstein |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | In the mainstream anthropology of Byzantine patristics, the human “I” is twice inconsistent, being identical to but different from a “part of God” and, in the created world, being not a something while without being a nothing. The latter kind of inconsistency was described as well by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his peculiar doctrine of subjectivity. |
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| ISSN: | 1817-7565 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Scrinium
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/18177565-00160A03 |