The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement
Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2020]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2020, Volume: 56, Numéro: 3, Pages: 390-408 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Religion
/ Divergence d'opinion
/ Savoir
/ Élargissement
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion AD Sociologie des religions AE Psychologie de la religion |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who are committed to religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000847 |