Flannery O'Connor and religious epistemology
What are the demands of religious inquiry? It can be tempting to think of these demands in strictly epistemic terms, e.g. as a function of the inquirer's background beliefs, cognitive faculties, natural cognitive ability, intellectual skills, and intellectual character. In this article, I extra...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2020]
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In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2020, Volume: 56, Issue: 3, Pages: 349-369 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
O'Connor, Flannery 1925-1964
/ Religion
/ Epistemic modal logic
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCA Ethics |
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Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | What are the demands of religious inquiry? It can be tempting to think of these demands in strictly epistemic terms, e.g. as a function of the inquirer's background beliefs, cognitive faculties, natural cognitive ability, intellectual skills, and intellectual character. In this article, I extrapolate an alternative model of religious inquiry from three stories by the Southern Gothic writer Flannery O'Connor (1925-1964). According to the model, a person's fitness for religious inquiry also depends on whether she possesses a certain moral posture. In particular, I argue that something like moral humility functions as an epistemic virtue in the theistic domain. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000562 |