Science and Other Common Nouns: Further Implications of Anti-Essentialism
The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by c...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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| Dans: |
Zygon
Année: 2020, Volume: 55, Numéro: 3, Pages: 782-791 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Reeves, Josh A. 1976-, Against methodology in science and religion
/ Sciences de la nature
/ Religion
/ Essentialisme
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion CF Christianisme et science |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Essentialism
B Évolution B Language B Scientific Method B History B Pseudoscience B Truth |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by communities. It becomes much more difficult on this antiessentialism position to identify and dismiss pseudo-science. I suggest we might find a way forward, though, by engaging a philosophical tradition that has largely been neglected in English-speaking science and religion studies, and by articulating a theory of consensus along the lines of Oreskes (2019). |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12622 |