Autonomy, Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re-examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre-natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims...

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Auteur principal: Pugh, Jonathan 1974- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Wiley-Blackwell [2015]
Dans: Bioethics
Année: 2015, Volume: 29, Numéro: 3, Pages: 145-152
RelBib Classification:NBE Anthropologie
NCH Éthique médicale
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Amélioration humaine
B Habermas
B Autonomy
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Résumé:Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre-natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.
ISSN:1467-8519
Contient:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12082