Autonomy, Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re-examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre-natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims...

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1. VerfasserIn: Pugh, Jonathan 1974- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Wiley-Blackwell [2015]
In: Bioethics
Jahr: 2015, Band: 29, Heft: 3, Seiten: 145-152
RelBib Classification:NBE Anthropologie
NCH Medizinische Ethik
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Habermas
B Autonomy
B Enhancement
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Zusammenfassung:Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre-natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.
ISSN:1467-8519
Enthält:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12082