Autonomy, Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re-examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate
Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre-natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2015]
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In: |
Bioethics
Jahr: 2015, Band: 29, Heft: 3, Seiten: 145-152 |
RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie NCH Medizinische Ethik VA Philosophie |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Habermas
B Autonomy B Enhancement |
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Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Zusammenfassung: | Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre-natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments. |
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ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12082 |