Hastening death and respect for dignity: Kantianism at the end of life
Suppose that a young athlete has just become quadriplegic. He expects to live several more decades, but out of self-interest he autonomously chooses to engage in physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Some of us are unsure whether he or his physician would be acting r...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2019]
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| Dans: |
Bioethics
Année: 2019, Volume: 33, Numéro: 5, Pages: 591-600 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCH Éthique médicale VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Voluntary Active Euthanasia
B Dignity B physician-assisted suicide B Velleman B Peignes B Kant |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Suppose that a young athlete has just become quadriplegic. He expects to live several more decades, but out of self-interest he autonomously chooses to engage in physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Some of us are unsure whether he or his physician would be acting rightly in ending his life. One basis for such doubt is the notion that persons have dignity in a Kantian sense. This paper probes responses that David Velleman and Frances Kamm have suggested to the question of whether participating in PAS or VAE to benefit oneself, as the young man might, respects the dignity of persons, specified in an orthodox Kantian way. Velleman claims that it does not, while Kamm insists that, in certain circumstances, it does. I argue against Kamm's position. I go on to contend that while orthodox Kantianism might provide a basis for moral concern regarding the case of the young quadriplegic, it suffers from two serious shortcomings. First, it implies that terminally ill patients are wrong to request VAE or engage in PAS to avoid intense suffering, at least when this suffering has not yet overwhelmed their reason. Second, orthodox Kantianism implies that it is wrong for physicians to withdraw such patients from life-sustaining treatments, even if they request it. To remedy these shortcomings, I sketch an unorthodox Kantian account of respect for the dignity of persons. This account promises to capture the idea that it would be morally problematic for doctors to help the young quadriplegic to die, but to avoid the shortcomings of an orthodox Kantian account. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12561 |