How to reject Benatar's asymmetry argument

In this article I reconsider David Benatar's primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3-5 to explain how each of these pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Magnusson, Erik (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell [2019]
In: Bioethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 33, Issue: 6, Pages: 674-683
RelBib Classification:NBE Anthropology
NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B procreative ethics
B quality of life argument
B Anti-natalism
B David Benatar
B asymmetry argument
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:In this article I reconsider David Benatar's primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3-5 to explain how each of these premises is in fact false. Finally, I conclude in Part 6 by considering the relationship between the asymmetry argument and the quality of life argument in Benatar's overall case for anti-natalism and argue that it is the latter argument that is actually doing the work. In this sense, the asymmetry argument is not only unsuccessful in generating Benatar's anti-natalist conclusion, it is also unnecessary as well.
ISSN:1467-8519
Contains:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12582