Epistemic Angst, Intellectual Courage and Radical Scepticism

The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not,...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 1973- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill [2019]
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Issue: 3, Pages: 206-222
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst / Knowledge acquisition / Scepticism
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B intellectual courage
B Kierkegaard
B Reasons Identity Thesis
B epistemic angst
B Cartesian picture
B radical skepticism
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned' within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch' with an ‘external' world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191388