Sharon Street's unsuccessful argument against theism
Sharon Street has argued that we should reject theism because we can accept it only at the cost of having good reason to doubt the reliability of our judgments as to what moral reasons there are. The success of her argument depends on the assumption that no realist account of normative reasons that...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2019]
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2019, Volume: 86, Numéro: 1, Pages: 17-24 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Street, Sharon 1973-
/ Théisme
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
problem of evil
B Argument against theism B Sharon Street |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Résumé: | Sharon Street has argued that we should reject theism because we can accept it only at the cost of having good reason to doubt the reliability of our judgments as to what moral reasons there are. The success of her argument depends on the assumption that no realist account of normative reasons that validates commonsense morality has a tenable secular epistemology. I argue that even given this (obviously contentious) assumption Street's argument does not succeed. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9696-8 |