Skeptical theism and the challenge of atheism

Skeptical theists hold that we should be skeptical about our ability to know the reasons that God would have for permitting evil, at least in particular cases. They argue for their view by setting aside actions that are wrong in themselves and focusing their attention on actions that are purportedly...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Sterba, James P. 1943- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2019]
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2019, Volume: 85, Numéro: 2, Pages: 173-191
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Théisme / Méthode sceptique / Athéisme
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
NBC Dieu
Sujets non-standardisés:B problem of evil
B Skeptical theism
B Pauline Principle
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Resolving-System)
Description
Résumé:Skeptical theists hold that we should be skeptical about our ability to know the reasons that God would have for permitting evil, at least in particular cases. They argue for their view by setting aside actions that are wrong in themselves and focusing their attention on actions that are purportedly right or wrong simply in terms of their consequences. However, I argue in this paper that once skeptical theists are led to take into account actions that are wrong in themselves, as they must, they cannot escape the conclusion that there is a logical contradiction between the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God and what would have to be God's permission of the significant and horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions found in our world.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9673-2